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Abstract
This paper studies the political economy of urban traffic policy. First, it examines
how the institutional setup affects the policy adopted by local governments. A city
council and a regional government (representing city and suburbs), elected by majority
voting, decide respectively on parking fees and road toll. Both are below the optimum
when median voters in city and suburbs prefer cars to public transport sufficiently more
than the average. Moreover, even if the city government would have set an optimal
road toll, the regional government blocks it when the median suburban voter prefers
cars strongly enough. Letting the city control both parking and road pricing may there-
fore increase chances of adoption for the latter. However, this is not necessarily optimal:
when local voters choose lower-than-optimal car charges, imperfect governmental coor-
dination may reduce the inefficiency, producing higher charges than if one government
controlled them both. Finally, we examine how the use of revenues affects acceptability
of road pricing. Earmarking for public transport is welfare enhancing, compared to
lump-sum redistribution, only if the city government is granted additional funds by the
national government.
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1 Introduction
Road congestion in major urban areas is an increasingly serious problem. Yet, even if
economists have for long argued in its favor, road pricing in city centers is still rare. Many
local politicians are reluctant to adopt it, fearing that voters will be opposed. Edinburgh,
Manchester, New York City and Copenhagen have abandoned plans for urban road pricing
in recent years, in spite of the fact that London, Stockholm and Milan have demonstrated
both the political feasibility and effectiveness of the policy.
Political acceptability is perhaps the greatest obstacle to the implementation of road pric-
ing. It is therefore important to understand what determines it. This is the objective of this
paper. Of course, the number of factors that determine acceptability of road tolls can hardly
be captured in a single model. Hence, we focus on three specific questions that, it seems,
have not received much attention in previous literature. First, how does the institutional
setup influence the choice of traffic policy made by local governments? Second, how is the
political sustainability of pricing schemes affected by the way their revenues are utilized?
Third, is the role of financial support by national governments crucial in improving local
policymakers’ attitudes regarding these schemes?
The relevance of the above issues is well illustrated by recent experience in the city of
Copenhagen. In early 2012 the Danish government decided to withdraw a long-debated
proposal for a central cordon toll. Mayors of surrounding municipalities strongly voiced their
opposition to the scheme, with a seemingly important influence on its rejection. Most of them
were unhappy because public transport fare reductions could not be implemented before the
road toll was introduced. These were considered essential to provide a viable alternative to
otherwise car-dependent commuters, but became unfeasible due to the national government‘s
refusal to cover the projected shortfall in the local public transport operator‘s budget.1
The impact of policies that curb traffic in city centers can substantially depend on an
individual‘s location within the urban area. Commuters living in suburbs are generally more
likely to travel by car than those who live in central areas. This is linked to cities becoming
sprawled as well as to the lack of alternative travel options. Also, the comfort, independence
and travel flexibility that cars provide make them attractive compared to other modes.2 These
features are likely to be more relevant the longer the trips one has to take. Secondly, revenue
redistribution is essential in determining winners and losers from road tolls. Suburban, car-
1see http://cphpost.dk/news/national/zealand-mayors-rebel-over-congestion-zone and
http://cphpost.dk/news/local/update-congestion-charge-reportedly-taken-table
2Schlag (1995, p.8) claims that “the car serves at the same time as a status-symbol, pleasure time activity
and an article of daily use. Most people regard freedom of choice on when and where to travel as a basic
right”. Commenting on a survey of commuters in Stuttgart he notes that “95% of participants agreed with
the statement ’The car guarantees my independence’ and that 75% with ’Driving a car is fun” ’.
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dependent voters may fear that they will not be fully compensated for higher travel costs,
since at least some of the revenues benefit people not using the priced roads. Revenues may
also be appropriated by a city administration that disregards suburbanites’ welfare. As a
consequence, policymakers representing suburban voters are unlikely to endorse central city
road tolls. This happened not only in Copenhagen, but in other cities as well. Similar
protests took place before the "Ecopass" road pricing scheme was introduced in Milan and
most of the municipalities around Stockholm voted, in a consultative referendum, against
the congestion charge.
This suggests that chances of adoption of road pricing may be diminished if it is under the
control of governments representing more than just city voters. In recent cases of successful
introduction of road tolls (i.e., London, Stockholm and Milan) city governments seem to have
been decisive. Experience was less favorable in cities where they were not. As examples, one
can mention Copenhagen as well as New York City where road pricing was approved by the
City Council, but ultimately blocked by the State Assembly. A related case is that of parking
fees. These have generally smaller influence over vehicle movement than tolls, but can have
a similar discouraging effect on car trips terminating in the city center. Parking fees tend
to generate significantly less political opposition than tolls, even in cities where the latter
were discarded. Unlike road pricing, parking is traditionally managed exclusively by city
governments. Again, the Copenhagen case is indicative: in the last seven years, the Danish
capital‘s City Council has substantially raised central parking fees. The political process
leading to their adoption seems to have been much smoother compared to that for road
pricing. To continue, while road pricing did not find support at the State Assembly level,
parking fees in Manhattan have been significantly increased by New York City‘s Department
of Transportation.
To give a possible explanation to these facts, the first part of this paper investigates how
the institutional setup affects the type of traffic policy adopted by local governments. We
consider an urban area consisting of a Central Business District (CBD) and two residential
areas: a city and the hinterland. Traffic policy consists of two monetary charges that one
may be asked to pay when driving to the CBD: a parking fee and a road toll. Individuals
differ in the utility they get from traveling by car relative to public transport (their default
option). To capture modal choice patterns that are recurrent in reality, we assume the share
of population preferring cars to public transport to be larger in the hinterland than in the
city. First, we look at the case in which both parking and road pricing are under the control
of the city government. A simple result emerges: when the median (decisive) city voter has
sufficiently stronger (resp. weaker) preferences for cars than the average voter, car charges
are smaller (larger) than optimal. Therefore, if the majority of the city population strongly
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values cars over public transportation, while the rest does not, the total car charge is below the
optimum. This is consistent with a quite intuitive correlation between voters’ reliance on cars
and their unwillingness to accept traffic restraining policies.3 We then look at a more complex
setup where a city council and a regional government (the latter representing the city and its
hinterland), both elected by majority voting, decide traffic policy. We assume, in particular,
that the former controls parking fees, while the latter controls the road toll, consistently
with the examples provided above. Intuitively, incentives for voters of city and hinterland
are not the same. This is because of different preferences for travel modes but also because
the city government can exploit tax-exporting possibilities when setting its own charge. By
its nature, the regional government cannot do so. Consequently road pricing receives the
smallest political support. In fact, when the median suburban voter has sufficiently stronger
preferences for cars relative to public transport, road pricing is blocked by the regional
government. This happens even if the city would have set a road toll at least as high as the
optimum, if it could have decided on it just as it does for parking fees.
From a practical standpoint, the above findings suggest simply that if the objective is to
increase chances of adoption for road pricing, city governments should be given the power to
decide on it, as is generally the case for parking fees. However, we find that this is socially
desirable only as long as the majority of city voters support socially optimal car charges.
This is instead not true when both city and suburban populations oppose them, i.e. when
the combination of parking fee and road toll results in a total car charge which is below the
optimum. The reason is that the city and regional government do not perfectly coordinate
when setting the respective charges. This produces a "double marginalization" phenomenon
and the total charge on car trips ends up being at least as high as if it were entirely under
the control of the city government. Interestingly, the “upward” bias produced by imperfect
governmental coordination may partially correct the “downward” bias resulting from voters’
preferences. In that case, we find, social welfare is at least as high with two non-coordinating
governments than if a single one controlled the whole set of policy instruments.4
In the second part of the paper, we investigate a different question: how the use of revenues
from proposed pricing schemes affects their public acceptability. In particular, we focus on the
effects of using the money (entirely or in part) to finance a subsidy to public transportation,
instead of redistributing it in the generic form of lump-sum transfers. It is commonly thought
3In most of the cities that recently implemented road pricing, the majority of peak-hour travelers were not
drivers (at the time of the schemes’ introduction). For instance, in London around 12% of trips to the charge
zone were made by car (TfL (2003)). In Stockholm, only a third of commuters travelled by car (Armelius
and Hulkrantz (2006)). In contrast, most cities in the U.S. and Australia travelers depend on cars to a large
extent. Few local governments have shown determination to restrict it.
4A similar reasoning suggests that the possibility for the local government to exploit tax-exporting op-
portunities may actually be welfare enhancing.
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that earmarking revenues for public transport improves public acceptability of road pricing.
Yet, our results suggest that such an effect can be achieved only on one important condition:
that the local government implementing the policy is granted extra funds to cover the costs
of an improved public transport service. More precisely, we find that if the socially optimal
road toll is not politically sustainable when revenues are redistributed in a less specific form,
earmarking them for public transport induces voters to accept a toll closer to the optimal
level only as long as these revenues are integrated by additional funds. In a nutshell, this is
because improvements to public transport are funded by taxing the very "goods" (i.e., car
trips to the city center) that are being discouraged. Consequently, the revenues collected
may not be enough to fund the public transportation upgrades necessary to ensure political
sustainability. The result suggests, therefore, that they should be part of "policy packages"
that include not only earmarked revenues for public transportation, but also additional grants
from central governments. Lack of financial support by the national government may have
favored rejection of road pricing in Copenhagen. On the contrary, the successful introduction
of the Stockholm Congestion Charge was accompanied by a public transport service expansion
funded in part by the Swedish government.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 relates this work to existing
literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 studies voting on traffic policy. Proofs
of all propositions and lemmas are provided in an Appendix. Section 5 presents a numerical
illustration of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
There is a large body of literature studying road congestion policy from a normative perspec-
tive (see Small and Verhoef (2007)).5 Political acceptability is one of the main issues holding
back traffic restraining measures. Yet, there are, quite surprisingly, very few papers looking
at traffic policy from a political economy perspective. To the best of my knowledge, only
De Borger and Proost (2012) and Marcucci et al. (2005) study voting on road pricing. De
Borger and Proost use a majority voting setup to study the role of voters’ uncertainty on the
cost of switching travel mode. Differently from them, we consider the presence of multiple
governments and taxes. However, we neglect voter uncertainty. Marcucci et al. use a citizen-
candidate game to model the political decision process on road pricing. A common finding
of both papers is that using charge revenues to subsidize public transport can improve the
5Most of the literature focuses on road pricing and infrastructure. There is also a part of this literature
looking at parking issues (e.g. Arnott and Inci (2006)). However, these papers take a purely normative
perspective, also neglecting the presence of multiple governments involved in congestion policy.
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acceptability of the optimal charge. Parry (2002) provides a normative analysis comparing
the effects of congestion charges and public transport subsidies. Differently from them, our
results point out the important role of extra funding from external governments. Another
related paper is Dunkerley et al. (2010), studying the political economy of fuel taxes. They
find that when aggregate income is high enough that drivers constitute the majority of the
population, voting results in too low fuel charges and viceversa. The opposite happens for
road capacity. While this result is similar to that of our paper, we consider individuals that
are heterogeneous in preferences for alternative transport modes. We also study interactions
between overlapping local governments, absent in their setup.
There is a growing literature that focuses on governmental competition in pricing of
road networks. This literature does not use a political economy approach and considers
governments as (local) welfare maximizers. De Borger et al. (2007) study the interaction
of different governments in setting traffic policy on parallel and serial networks. They find
that imperfect coordination among them can lead to significant deviations from the optimal
pricing and investment scheme. As mentioned above, this is not necessarily the case in our
model. In fact, imperfect coordination among the two governments may actually increase
social welfare. Ubbels and Verhoef (2008) study the choice of pricing and capacity investments
by a city and a hinterland government, each controlling one part of a two link road network
leading to the city’s Central Business District. Horizontal tax competition and tax exporting
lead to higher tolls on the city than on the hinterland section of the network. These results,
however, do not explain why car charges in city centers may face strong political opposition.
This paper provides a possible explanation.
3 The model
The analysis below studies how local politicians choose traffic policy, given that they are
elected by majority voting. We here describe the basic ingredients of the model. These are
essential to understand how traffic policy affects the behavior and welfare of individuals and,
in turn, how this determines the way in which their vote is cast.
Spatial structure. There is a “large” population (whose size is normalized to 1) living
in an urban area. A first group of individuals, a fraction λ (0, 1) of the total, is assumed
to live within the boundaries of a city’s jurisdiction. A second group (the remaining 1 − λ
fraction) lives in the city’s hinterland. The city also includes a Central Business District
(CBD), where no one lives but where all travel goes (e.g. for commuting purposes). We
model the three areas as point sized islands, denoted CBD, C and H (Figure 1). Since our
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focus is on short-run effects of traffic policy, we assume residential locations to be fixed and
ignore land market considerations.6
Figure 1: Spatial setting
Individuals. All individuals travel to CBD, on two alternative modes. We have trips by
car, whose quantity is denoted by q, and trips by public transport, whose quantity is denoted
as b. Both are non-negative continuous variables. A car trip consists of two complementary
activities: driving to CBD and parking the car once there. This means that, per each car
trip, an individual may have to pay two charges (should they exist): a road toll to enter the
CBD and a parking charge (see below). Individuals also care for a consumption good n (a
numeraire, whose price is fixed and normalized to one).
We assume (as in De Borger and Proost (2012)) that the decision of how much to travel
at peak-hour is exogenous. For all individuals travel demand is fixed at a positive and large
quantity Y , so b + q = Y . This is, for example, the case of commuters who need to reach
the workplace (at peak hours) a given number of times during the year. This simplifies the
analysis and is consistent with a short-run interpretation of the model: in the short run,
individuals may find it hard to adjust their (total) travel demand, especially when travel is
for work purposes. The choice of how to travel is however endogenous.7
The marginal utility of a trip by public transport is zero: public transport is a "default"
travel mode to which the individual assigns all the trips she does not consider it worthwhile
to take by car. The marginal utility of a car trip is increasing in the individual specific
parameter r ≥ 0. This captures the intensity of the individual‘s preference for cars relative
to public transportation. For instance, the car generally allows greater independence of
movement. Moreover, r can capture the relative quality of the two modes as it is perceived
by the individual. For example, the individual may find public transport to be uncomfortable
or unreliable: in that case, it is more likely that r is larger. Its value can also depend on
the physical structure of the city (e.g. its density) and the place where the individual resides
(see below).
6Fixed residential locations are a commonly found simplification in models studying commuting costs
(e.g.,Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010))
7In reality, not all the population travels at peak hours. This (e.g. unemployed or retired people) could
easily be accounted for including a fraction of the population who does not derive any utility from peak hour
travel, characterized by r = 0 and Y = 0.
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Individuals have the following utility function8
U(q, n; r) = 2 (qr)
1
2 + n
The parameter r is exogenously distributed, in each population C and H, according to a
CdF FC(r) for C and FH(r) for H, with the same support σ = [0, ru]. We assume that
FH(r) < FC(r), for any r ∈ σ. Denoting rˆC (resp. rˆH) as the median individual in C (resp.
H ), so FC(rˆC) = FH(rˆH) = 12 , this implies that rˆC ≤ rˆH . The idea is that, all else equal, an
individual living in H is more likely to find public transport less viable than one living in C.
It is intuitive that, because of this assumption, people in suburbs will drive more frequently
than people in the city in equilibrium. We denote the average value of r, for the entire
population as
r¯ = λ
ˆ ru
0
rdFC(r) + (1− λ)
ˆ ru
0
rdFH(r)
We also denote
rˆ = λrˆC + (1− λ) rˆH
the weighted average of r for the median individuals in the two subpopulations.
Travel options, costs and budgets. Consider individuals living in C. The monetary cost
of a car trip from C to CBD is p = t+d, where t is the sum of charges on car trips set by local
governments (i.e. parking and road pricing) and d is an exogenous resource cost (e.g fuel).
T is the (monetary equivalent of) time cost of such a trip. We denote by A the generalized
cost of a public transport trip. For an individual living in C, the budget constraint is
M + LC ≥ n+ (p+ T ) q + Ab
where M is undifferentiated (exogenous) income and LC is the (sum of) lump-sum transfers
paid to people living in C. We assume that p + T > A always holds. We ignore, for the
moment, subsidies to public transport. They will be introduced below.
The time cost of a car trip T is a linear function of traffic volume Q (the aggregate amount
of car trips).9 This captures road congestion which, for simplicity, is assumed to develop only
8This functional form is convenient because of its tractability, allowing smooth aggregation of preferences.
Linearity in consumption and costs of travel is however a common assumption in the literature on road
pricing (see, e.g., De Borger and Proost (2012), de Palma et al. (2010), Arnott et al. (1993)).
9Linearity of the congestion function is commonly assumed in models of road pricing: see, e.g., De Borger
and Proost (2012)
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on the portion of the road network that links C to CBD. We have
T (Q) = γQ
where γ > 0 is constant, so the partial derivative is TQ = γ. When deciding on the number
of car trips to be taken, individuals consider T as given: there is a congestion externality. A
is instead assumed to be independent of the amount of traffic.
Individuals living in H have to sustain the additional cost of the trip from H to C.
We denote by x the generalized cost of travel from H to C by car, and by xb if by public
transport. We make two simplifying assumptions: first, both are independent of traffic
volumes as congestion on the road linking C to H is ignored. Second, we assume that,
because of the low availability of public transport in suburban areas, x < xb. Individuals
wanting to reach the CBD by public transport thus optimally drive from H to a park-and-
ride facility in C. Consequently, the extra cost of travel from H to C is simply x. There
is, however, an inconvenience of switching modes that reduces the attractiveness of public
transport for individuals in H, compared to those in C. The assumption that FH(r) < FC(r),
for any r ∈ σ, captures also this effect.10Given these assumptions, the budget constraint for
an individual in H is:
M + LH ≥ n+ (p+ T + x) q + (A+ x) b
where LH is the lump-sum transfer paid to people in H.
Timing. The sequence of events is as follows
1. Local governments decide traffic policy variables (resulting in the total charge t). As we
will illustrate below, governments are elected (and policies chosen) by majority voting.
When casting their vote, voters perfectly anticipate their utility at the following stage.
2. Taking policy variables as given, individuals decide the amount of trips q, b and con-
sumption n, maximizing U(.).
10Of course, there may be costs of parking and switching modes at the facility, which we do not explicitly
model. However, including them would complicate the analysis without affecting the main results. They
would discourage people in H from using public transport to reach the CBD compared to people in C,
inflating their demand for cars. Hence, suburban commuters would be hit harder by car charges. This is
already the case since we assume FH(r) < FC(r), for any r ∈ σ. Alternatively, suppose a trip from H to CBD
had to be taken either entirely by car or entirely by public transport: it would still be reasonable to assume
that the extra cost of travel for suburban commuters is such that x < xb. Again, the consequence would be
that of increasing suburban commuters’ demand for car trips (all else equal) compared to city dwellers. This
would make them even more unwilling to support car charges, thereby making the regional government less
likely to adopt them (see Proposition 2). Our qualitative results would not change.
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Individual behavior once policy variables are set. Suppose the total charge on car
trips t is set. Individuals maximize their utility choosing the amount of trips q and b as well
as consumption n (after receiving transfers from the governments). This leads to the demand
function
q(t; r) =
r
(p+ T − A)
If r = 0, the individual obtains the same utility from both car and a public transport trips.
Since p+T > A always holds, so she never uses the car. Recall that, for a traveler, b+q = Y ,
with total travel demand Y being fixed, so b(t; r) = Y − q(t; r). By the linearity of U(.) in n,
trip quantities are independent of income (and transfers). Substituting q(t; r) and b(t; r) into
U(.) and using the individuals’ budget constraint, we get, after simplification, the indirect
utility functions
VC(t; r) =
r
(p+ T − A) +M + L
C + AY (1)
VH(t; r) =
r
(p+ T − A) +M + L
H + (A− x)Y (2)
for individuals living, respectively, in C and H. To obtain the aggregate demand for car trips
Q(t), we integrate q(t; r) over σ, for both C and H, to get
Q(t) = q(t; r¯) =
r¯
(p+ T − A)
Thus, the aggregate amount of car trips in the economy coincides with that of the “average”
individual, of type r = r¯. It is easy to show that, even after accounting for feedback effects
due to the reduction in T , we have dQ
dp
< 0. From now on, we will denote, in order to save
on notation, q(t; r) simply as q(r). Similarly, Q(t) will be simply denoted by Q
Governments and policy instruments. There are two local governments: a city govern-
ment GC and a regional government GR. The city government represents only the population
in C. It controls a non-negative monetary charge tC (a component of the total car charge t),
paid per each car trip by all drivers.
GR is a regional government representing both people living in C and in H. It is assumed
to control a non-negative per-car-trip charge tR (another component of t), also paid by all
drivers. To be consistent with the examples provided in the Introduction, we identify tC as
a parking charge and tR as a cordon toll around the city’s CBD. The total charge paid for a
car trip to CBD is thus
t = tC + tR
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We denote by pi the vector of traffic policy variables
pi = (tC , tR)
We assume lump-sum redistribution of charge revenues: the local governments GC and
GR fully rebate to each individual in their respective populations an equal share of the charge
revenues, using undifferentiated lump-sum transfers LGC and LGR .11 The government budget
constraints are thus
λLGC = tCQ and LGR = tRQ
for GC and GR respectively. Recall that GC represents only a fraction λ(0, 1) of the total
population, the only one entitled to transfer LC . The lump sum transfer paid to individuals
residing in C is therefore
LC = LGC + LGR
while it is just
LH = LGR
if the individual resides in H. In Section 4.2 we will look at the possibility of redistributing
revenues in alternative forms, specifically by financing public transportation.
Note that tC and tR are both modelled as per-unit taxes on car trips, paid by all individu-
als. 12 Indeed, in our model they enter demands for car and public transport travel in exactly
the same way (only the total charge t matters). The key difference between them is the way
in which local governments redistribute the revenues they generate. Of course, we are making
a simplification as in reality parking fees and road tolls are imperfect substitutes. Yet, when
one considers trips ending in the CBD, the discouraging effect of the two instruments is quite
similar.
It is also useful to note that our setup entails fiscal externalities: first, there is tax-
exporting at the city level, since all individuals pay tC but only people in C are entitled
to the revenues. Moreover, the two local governments may act strategically and imperfectly
coordinate. As is quite standard, their effect is to inflate car charges set by local governments.
However, their impact on social welfare is not necessarily negative and depends on voters’
attitudes, as will be discussed below.
11We implicitly assume that, due to information asymmetries (individuals‘ preferences being unobservable),
personalized transfers are not incentive compatible and, hence, unfeasible.
12In many cities, not all drivers pay for parking. This may be due to the limited powers of local governments
(Bonsall and Young (2010)), but it may also be due to lack of political will. It seems therefore appropriate
to study the governments’ behavior allowing them, a priori, to charge parking fees for every trip to the CBD.
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Social Welfare. We consider a utilitarian social welfare function W (t). This is obtained
by integrating (1) and (2) over σ, for both C and H. We have thus
W (t) = λ
ˆ ru
0
VC(t, T, A; r)dFC(r) + (1− λ)
ˆ ru
0
VH(t, T, A; r)dFH(r)
=
r¯
(p+ T − A) +M + λLGC + LGR + AY − xY (1− λ)
which, replacing for λLC and LR gives
W (t) =
r¯
(p+ T − A) +M − AY + tQ− xY (1− λ) (3)
Only the sum of car charges matters from a pure welfare maximization perspective: tC and tR
are perfectly equivalent instruments. Importantly, this is not the case from voters’ perspec-
tive. Once again, this is because the three instruments affect governments’ budgets in dif-
ferent ways. Hence, their impact on voters‘ welfare is uneven and crucially depends, coeteris
paribus, on where they live.
As a benchmark, consider the case where t is set by a welfare-maximizing government,
whose objective is just to maximize (3). We obtain the following simple result13
LEMMA: Denote QFB ≡ Q (tFB). The welfare-maximizing policy tFB is equal to the
marginal external cost of a car trip: tFB = γQFB.
4 Voting on traffic policy
We now introduce majority voting as the social choice process by which traffic policy is
determined. Our focus will be first on the role of the institutional setup and secondly on the
role of subsidies to public transportation (ignored in the first part).
4.1 The relation between institutional setup and traffic policy cho-
sen by local governments
Our first objective is to study how the institutional setup influences the policy chosen by
local governments. We proceed in the following way: first, we look at the choice of the city
government, for any (given) charge set at the regional level. This also allows us to study
13Given quasilinear utility and a utilitarian social welfare function, there is an infinite set of first-best
allocations differing in the distribution of n but not in trip quantities. This is why setting tFB = γQFB is
sufficient to implement any first best allocation, irrespectively of how income (consumption) is distributed in
the urban area.
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the special case in which the regional government has no say on traffic policy. It can easily
be shown that, if the city government controlled the total charge t, this would be set at the
same level as that of tC when no charge is set at the regional level (i.e. tR = 0). Hence, this
case provides a useful reference to which we compare the equilibrium when both governments
intervene in traffic policy. We then look at the equilibrium of the full voting procedure where
tC and tR are simultaneously determined. In order to capture imperfect coordination between
city and regional governments, we assume voting takes place following a Shepsle Procedure
(Shepsle (1979)). This means that policy variables are simultaneously chosen, with each local
government (elected by majority voting) taking as given the choice of the counterpart.14
4.1.1 Voting by the city on the charge tC
Let us first look at the election at the city level. The single policy dimension the city
government has to decide on is the car charge tC , taking tR as given. We now describe
preferences for tC for individuals living in C. We start from the indirect utility function (1)
for a type-r traveler (written after replacing LGC and LGR):
VC(pi; r) =
r
(p+ T − A) +M + (s− A)Y +
tCQ
λ
+ tRQ (4)
To find the most-preferred charge t∗C(tR; s, r) by the type-r individual, we maximize (4) with
respect to tC . The first-order derivative writes as
∂VC(pi; r)
∂tC
= −q(r) ·
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+
Q+ tC
dQ
dp
λ
+ tR
dQ
dp
(5)
A marginal increase in tC affects VC(pi; r) in two ways: it raises (since 0 < 1 + TQ dQdp < 1)
the generalized price of a car trip p + T . This affects individuals depending on the amount
of driving q(r). Secondly, it changes the amount of revenues from car charges tC and tR,
as well as expenditures to finance public transport s. The relevance of effects on revenues
is greater the smaller the size of the city population relative to the entire urban area’s λ.
This encourages city voters to raise tC , due to a tax-exporting force (i.e. shifting the tax
burden mostly on individuals who are not entitled to revenues). The most-preferred policy
by an individual of type r, denoted t∗C(tR; r), is such that (5) is equal to zero. Individuals’
preferences on tC satisfy the Single Crossing property, for any tR (proof of this is embedded
in the proof of Lemma 1, in the Appendix). This is the basis to establish the following
LEMMA 1: When the city votes on the car charge tC, for any given regional charge tR,
14To be more precise, each local government has a single policy variable to decide upon and chooses the
Condorcet winner among them, given the policy chosen by the counterpart.
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there exists a unique majority voting equilibrium tC (tR). It coincides with the most-preferred
policy vector (given tR) for the median voter in the city population, t∗C(tR; rˆC). This is such
that ∂tC
∂rˆC
, ∂tC
∂λ
< 0 and −1 < ∂tC
∂tR
≤ 0.
The intuition is simple: the stronger an individual‘s preferences for cars (represented by
rˆC) the more she will suffer from higher car charges. Smaller city size λ (relative to the
total population) makes increasing the city-controlled charge more interesting. Lemma 1
also describes how the city government responds to a marginal increase in the road toll tR.
When facing an increase in the toll decided by the regional government, the city government
reduces the charge it controls less than proportionally. This depends on the fact that a higher
toll shrinks the tax base for both charges. However, city voters only partially internalize the
effect on the latter.15
A simplified scenario: both car charges controlled by the city government
Before we introduce the full voting equilibrium, it is useful to consider a simplified setup
in which the regional government GR is not involved in traffic policy. Hence, there is no
regionally-controlled car charge, so tR = 0. This is interesting because tC is set at the same
level as the total charge t would be if the city administration had full control of both parking
and road pricing (and of the revenues they generate). This is because the two charges are
modelled as the same instruments and enter demand functions q(pi; r) and b(pi; r) in exactly
the same way. The resulting car charge is tE = tC (0), which we compare to the benchmark
charge tFB in the following
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that the city government controls both car charges and redis-
tributes their revenues to city voters via a lump-sum transfer. If the median individual in
the city population prefers car travel, compared to public transport, sufficiently more than the
average individual, then the total car charge tE is smaller than optimal. That is, if rˆC > r¯λ ,
then tE = tC (0) is such that tE < tFB. Otherwise, tE ≥ tFB.
A scenario in which the majority of the city population is “car dependent” (with high r)
and has strong preference for cars relative to public transport, while the rest of the population
does not, is consistent with a left-skewed distribution of r, where rˆC > r¯λ . This, according
to Proposition 1, will undermine political support for car charges. People who commute
15From the perspective of the city government, parking and congestion charge are strategic substitutes.
Although this depends on the structure of our model, it is not an uncommon finding in the literature. There
is also anecdotal evidence that the introduction of congestion charges has led to a reduction in parking
charges (see “Congestion charge brings an unlikely benefit – parking in Central London at 20p an hour”,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4144284.ece).
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regularly by car at peak-hours stand to pay a high price if a charge on car trips is introduced.
If, as can be expected, a part of the population can avoid it (because it travels by public
transport or simply does not travel at all at peak-hours, e.g. the retired or unemployed),
revenues collected are insufficient to compensate frequent drivers. If the latter are a majority,
it is less likely that elected officials will support the optimal car charge.
We can argue that the distribution described above is consistent with travel patterns
and modal shares characterizing cities that have shown little or no interest in congestion
charging. For instance, in most U.S. and Australian cities more than 90% of peak hour
trips are by car. It is thus likely that the majority of the population is of frequent peak-hour
drivers. Few local governments there have been keen on introducing central city road pricing.
The most significant exception is New York, where the share of peak-hour trips by public
transport is much larger. Car-dependent cities can be found also in the European context.
An example is Dublin. More than 60% of people in the Greater Dublin area use cars to get
to work: Irish Transport Minister Dempsey stated in 2008 that “congestion pricing would be
ruled out for at least eight more years”.16 On the other hand, among the cities that recently
implemented road pricing, the majority of peak-hour trips were not taken by car at the time
of the scheme introduction. For instance, in London the share of peak-hour trips by car was
12% (TfL (2003)). In Stockholm, only a third of commuters traveled by car to the central
city (Armelius and Hulkrantz (2006)).
Proposition 1 also suggests that political support for car charges at the city level may also
depend on the ability by the local government to “export” them. That is, make drivers that
come from outside its jurisdiction pay. Such possibility is, intuitively, more interesting for the
city government the smaller the relative size of its population λ, compared to the entire urban
area. The volume of revenues that can be extracted from suburban commuters is larger and
each city voter is entitled to a bigger share. Tax exporting by local governments is a fiscal
externality and, generally, a welfare-diminishing phenomenon. Yet, interestingly, if voters do
not support car taxes, the tax exporting possibility may actually be welfare-enhancing. We
will have more to say about this below.
4.1.2 Voting on the charge tR
Let us now move back to the more complex scenario with the regional government also
involved in traffic policy, deciding on tR. To describe the election at the regional level, it is
important to distinguish between individuals in the city C and the hinterland H. The former
will choose their most-preferred tR (with tC given) maximizing (4). A traveler living in H
16See http://www.independent.ie/national-news/congestion-levies-ruled-out-for-eight-years-by-dempsey-
1298005.html
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will instead maximize
VH(pi; r) =
r
(p+ T − A) +M + (A− x)Y + tRQ (6)
and, unlike individuals living in C, neglect the fact that a higher road toll tR reduces the
tax base for the city government. Moreover, tR revenues are redistributed by the regional
government to the entire urban area: there is no tax-exporting motive for the road toll. On
the other hand, since rˆC ≤ rˆR, we can expect the majority of the population in the hinterland
to drive more often, to get to CBD, than that in the city. All else equal, this makes them
more reluctant to accept the toll tR than city-dwellers.
Existence of a (not necessarily unique) voting equilibrium for the road toll tR (tC), for
any tC and s, is ensured by the fact that voters’ preferences on tR are single-peaked (this
is shown in the Appendix). However, identification of the pivotal voter for the road toll is
problematic. This is because individuals in city and suburbs face different budget constraints,
as the former are entitled to transfers from both city and regional government, unlike the
latter. Hence, on top of preferences, there are two dimensions of heterogeneity for voters
at the regional level. In order to avoid excessive complications, we limit ourselves to prove
that the equilibrium tR (tC) belongs to the interval spanned by the most-preferred values
tC∗R (tC ; rˆC) and tH∗R (tC ; rˆH) by the median individuals in, respectively, city and hinterland.
Albeit partial, this is useful information to characterize the full equilibrium piE below.
LEMMA 2: For any city car charge tC, denote tC∗R (tC ; rˆC) as the most-preferred road
toll by the median individual in C. Denote tH∗R (tC ; rˆH) as the most-preferred road toll by the
median individual in H. When the entire urban area’s population votes on tR, a majority
voting equilibrium tR(tC) exists and belongs to I =
[
tC∗R (tC ; rˆC), t
H∗
R (tC ; rˆH)
]
Note that this interval is not necessarily full: in particular, if rˆH is large enough, the
bounds of I coincide, as we will see below.
4.1.3 Equilibrium of the full voting procedure
We denote as piE = (tEC , tER) the equilibrium policy vector resulting from the full voting pro-
cedure (with tC and tR being determined simultaneously). In order to provide a description
of piE, it is useful to begin by identifying intervals containing its components tEC and tER.
LEMMA 3: Define pi = (tC , tR) where tR = tH∗R (tC ; rˆH) and tC = tC
(
tR
)
. Define also
pi = (t¯C , tR) where tR = tC∗R (t¯C , rˆC) and t¯C = tC
(
tR
)
. The equilibrium policy vector piE is
such that 0 ≤ tC ≤ tEC ≤ tC and 0 = tR ≤ tER ≤ tR. Moreover, tC ≤ tE ≤ tC + tR.
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Figure 2: Depiction of the intervals for tEC , tER and tE
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the intervals in which tEC , tER and their sum tE lie. The
red line depicts the best response function tC (tR; s) for the city government. Given Lemma 1
and 2, the equilibrium couple
(
tEC , t
E
R
)
(which may not be unique) necessarily belongs to the
segment of the red line delimited by the blue lines, representing tC∗R (tC , rˆC) and tH∗R (tC ; rˆH).
Vector pi (that would obtain if tER = tC∗R (tC ; rˆC), i.e. the median city voter rˆC were decisive
at both the city and the regional votes) is such that the road toll is zero, i.e. tR = 0. The
reason is that, with this institutional setup, if she was decisive both at the city and regional
level, any city voter would make use only of the parking charge tC , which guarantees her the
largest share of revenues. To continue, since −1 < ∂tC
∂tR
≤ 0 (by Lemma 1), components of pi
mark the lower bound for road toll tER, as well as the upper bound for the parking charge tEC .
For the same reason, tC also represents the lower bound on the total car charge tE = tEC + tER
in equilibrium. The opposite extremes are marked by vector pi, which we would obtain if the
median individual in the hinterland population H were decisive in the vote on the road toll
tR, i.e. tER = tH∗R (tC ; rˆC). Components of pi also identify the upper bound for tE.
We are now in a position to compare the equilibrium piE and the welfare-maximizing policy
vector piFB. Before introducing the results, we need to define r+ ≡ r¯
(
1 + 1−λ
1+TQ
dQ
dp
(tFB)
)
.17
Note that r+ > r¯. We have the following
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the city government controls the parking fee tC and the re-
17There is a unique r+, given r¯ and λ. There is therefore no endogeneity in the conditions on parameters
presented below, as they come down to comparing a linear combination of rˆC and rˆH to a function of r¯ and
λ. All are exogenous parameters.
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gional one controls the road toll tR. Suppose revenues are rebated via lump-sum transfers.
The equilibrium traffic policy vector piE =
(
tEC , t
E
R
)
is such that
• If median voters in both city and hinterland prefer car travel, compared to public trans-
port, sufficiently more than the average voter (i.e. rˆC > r¯λ and rˆ > r
+ hold), the total
car charge is lower than optimal tEC + tER < tFB
• The opposite, i.e. tEC + tER ≥ tFB, happens if the median city voter does not prefer cars,
compared to public transport, sufficiently more than average (i.e. rˆC ≤ r¯λ). When this
condition holds, if the city controlled both road toll and parking fee, the toll would be at
least as high as optimal.
• Even then, if the median voter in the hinterland has sufficiently strong preferences for
cars (i.e. rˆH is high enough), no road toll is implemented by the regional government,
i.e. tER = 0
• The sum of parking fee and road toll tE is at least as high as if the city government
controlled them both
Lemma 3 provided us with some bounds on the equilibrium values of policy variables. In
particular, we obtained that tC ≤ tEC + tER ≤ tC + tR. In the Appendix, we prove that, if
rˆ ≥ r+ and rˆC ≥ r¯λ , then tC + tR < tFB. Therefore, tEC + tER < tFB. We also prove that, if
rˆC <
r¯
λ
, we have t¯C ≥ tFB. Thus, tEC + tER ≥ tFB. Finally, we prove that, when rˆ > r+, it is
either the case that tR > 0 and tC + tR < tFB, or tR = 0 and piE = p¯i = pi. Given the bounds
derived in Lemma 3, we can conclude that, when rˆC < r¯λ and rˆ > r
+ are verified, we have a
sufficient condition to have no road toll, i.e. tER = 0. On the other hand, the parking charge
is set at the highest acceptable level for the decisive city voter, i.e. tEC = t¯C . Note that what
we just described is a sufficient, though not necessary, condition to have tER = 0. All else
given, a larger intensity of preferences for cars by the median individual in the hinterland
rˆH , reduces t¯R getting it closer to zero, as illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Change in the bounds of intervals for tEC , tER and tE as rˆH is increased, all else equal.
tR is reduced while tC increases. The upper bound for the total charge t¯ is also smaller.
These findings suggest quite a negative perspective for road pricing. Suppose the major-
ity of the city population prefers cars, relative to public transport, significantly more than
average, so rˆC > r¯λ holds. The city is, then, unwilling to support both the parking charge
and the road toll. The same is likely to be true for the hinterland population, which is likely
to have even stronger preferences for cars. In fact, even if the median city voter cares little
more for car driving than for public transport (i.e., rˆC < r¯λ holds), as long as the median
individual in the suburban population has sufficiently strong preferences for cars, the road
toll tR collapses to zero. It may actually be that a sufficient condition for the city to choose
a road toll at least as high as the optimum (if it could control it jointly with the parking
charge) holds, yet the road toll is blocked by the regional government. As a response, the
city government sets the parking charge at the highest level acceptable by its voters.
This suggests that an institutional setup where road pricing is under the control of regional
authorities, rather than city governments, may not facilitate its adoption. Experience of cities
presented in the Introduction seems quite consistent with this statement: in recent cases of
successful implementation of road tolls (i.e., London, Stockholm and Milan), city governments
have been decisive. In cases where they were not, outcomes have been less favorable. This
was the case in Copenhagen (as discussed in the Introduction) as well as New York City where
road pricing was approved by the City Council, but ultimately blocked by the State Assembly.
On the other hand, parking charges, generally under exclusive control of city governments,
are often used to discourage commuting to city centers and adopted through much smoother
approval processes. This is true even in cities where road pricing was discarded. Again,
Copenhagen seems like a fitting example: in the last seven years, the City Council has
substantially raised central parking fees with the objective of discouraging car commuting.
The immediate implication of this finding is that, in order to improve chances of adoption
19
of road tolls, city governments should be allowed to decide on them, as is the case for
parking fees. However, our results suggest that letting the city government control both
car charges is not always socially desirable. Indeed, we find that splitting control of traffic
policy instruments among two governments is actually (weakly) preferable when both city
and suburban populations oppose car charges. Interestingly, the reason is that the city and
regional government do not coordinate. None of them fully takes into account the effect of a
marginal increase of the charge it controls on the revenues generated by the charge set by the
counterpart (a fiscal externality).18 As a consequence, we have a phenomenon similar to the
“double marginalization” studied in the industrial organization literature. Thus, car charges
end up being at least as high as if both were under the control of the city government (last
point of Proposition 2).
The above is a novel result in the literature on governmental interactions in pricing ac-
cess to a given piece of infrastructure. Previous literature, neglecting the possibility that
governments respond to heterogeneous voters, has argued that imperfect governmental co-
ordination is generally detrimental to social welfare (De Borger et al. (2007), Ubbels and
Verhoef (2008)). In our model, this is not necessarily true: the “upward” bias produced
by imperfect coordination may partially correct the “downward” bias resulting from voters’
preferences.
COROLLARY: When the median individuals in both city and hinterland prefer car travel,
compared to public transport, sufficiently more than the average voter (i.e. rˆC > r¯λ and
rˆ > r+), social welfare when the (non-coordinating) city and regional government control,
respectively, parking fee and road toll is at least as high as when the city government controls
them both.
4.2 The role of subsidies to public transportation
The analysis has so far neglected the possibility of using public transport subsidies to in-
fluence voters’ attitudes towards car charges, such as road tolls. We here investigate such
a question. We will first look at how exogenous provision of the subsidy may affect the
voting equilibrium on t. As a second step, we will compare the equilibria obtained when
revenues are redistributed in the generic form of a lump-sum transfer and when they are
instead earmarked for the more specific purpose of financing public transport.
18The two-government setup is weakly prefereable because, if tER = 0, the total car charge is the same in
the two scenarios and so is welfare.
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Modified setup. Since we do not focus on the institutional setup, we simplify the analysis
on that front by assuming that there is a single car charge t (e.g. a proposed road toll)
controlled by the city government. We disregard the presence of a regional government.
Additional complexity comes from the presence of s, a (non-negative) subsidy to public
transport, which, in the form of fare discounts or improved service, reduces A. The traffic
policy vector pi is now
pi = (t; s)
For any individual, the budget constraint is thus
M + L ≥ n+ (p+ T + x) q + (A− s+ x) b
with x = 0 if the individual lives in C. The demand for car trips of a type-r individual is now
q(pi; r) =
r
(p+ T + s− A)
while b(pi; r) = Y − q(pi; r). We still have q(pi; r¯) = Q (pi). Note that p and s enter demands
for car and public transport trips in exactly the same way. This is due to the assumptions of
fixed transport demand and that trip costs enter utility linearly. We also have dQ
dp
= dQ
ds
< 0.
We assume the city government finances an (exogenously set) portion 0 < α ≤ 1 of subsidy
expenditures s (Y −Q). Hence, only if α = 1 the city finances the subsidy entirely out of her
own budget. The remaining share 1− α is covered with money raised from general taxation
at a nationwide level (assumed to put a negligible burden on the urban area’s population):
this essentially represents a grant from the national government.
In what follows we will consider two redistribution rules for the revenues generated by car
charges: lump-sum redistribution and earmarking for public transportation. Under lump-sum
redistribution, GC uses (as in the previous Section) an undifferentiated lump-sum transfer
LGC to rebate revenues to its voters. The city government’s budget constraint is thus
λLGC = tCQ− αs (Y −Q)
so that the indirect utility function (1) for a type-r individual (written after replacing LGC
and LGR = 0 and redenoting tC as t) is
VC(pi; r) =
r
(p+ T − A+ s) +M + (s− A)Y +
tQ− αs (Y −Q)
λ
(7)
Under earmarking of for public transport, revenues from t are instead used to finance s: we
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have thus LGC = 0 and the budget balance condition
tQ = αs(Y −Q)
has to hold.
The utilitarian social welfare function W (pi) is computed as in the previous section, ex-
cept that we now need to subtract the cost of s which is not covered by GC ’s budget,
(1− α) s (Y −Q). We have thus
W (pi) = λ
ˆ ru
0
VC(pi, T,A; r)dFC(r) + (1− λ)
ˆ ru
0
VH(pi, T,A; r)dFH(r)− (1− α) s (Y −Q)
=
r¯
(p+ T + s− A) +M + λLGC + LGR + (s− A)Y − (1− α) s (Y −Q)− xY (1− λ)
which, replacing for λLGC (as computed above) and LGR = 0 (the regional government having
no role here) gives (irrespectively of the rebate rule adopted)
W (pi) =
r¯
(p+ T + s− A) +M − AY + (t+ s)Q− xY (1− λ) (8)
As the reader can conjecture at this point, due to our assumption of fixed total trip quan-
tity, only the sum of car charges and public transport subsidy t + s matters from a pure
welfare maximization perspective: t and s are perfectly equivalent instruments. Indeed, the
benchmark policy vector piFB =
(
tFB; sFB
)
is now such that
(t+ s)FB = γQFB
i.e., the first-best combination of car taxes and subsidies to public transport (t+ s)FB is
equal to the marginal external cost of a car trip.
4.2.1 The effect of providing a subsidy to public transport
We here study the effect of switching from a policy with no public transport subsidy (i.e.
s = 0) to one where the subsidy is introduced (i.e. s > 0). We assume that revenues from
the road toll, net of subsidy expenditures, are redistributed to the population through a
lump-sum transfer. If the difference between charge revenues and costs of financing public
transport is negative, the shortfall is covered via a lump-sum tax. The subsidy level is set
exogenously.19 Provision of public transport subsidies is often advocated to weaken voters’
19If we had let the city vote on s as well as t, as long as α = 1, this would have resulted in s = 0 and,
consequently, no change in tE . This is because, to curb car traffic, city voters would rather make use of a car
charge that produces extra revenues (being paid also by the people from H ), than finance a subsidy to public
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opposition to proposed road tolls. This is why we focus our attention on the case where,
when s = 0, the city government chooses a charge tE below the welfare-maximizing level tFB.
We obtain the following
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that, when revenues are redistributed lump-sum and no sub-
sidy to public transport is provided, the voting equilibrium is such that the road toll t is lower
than optimal. If a subsidy to public transport is provided, the toll gets closer to the optimum
only if the subsidy is partially financed by the national government.
Denote as tE0 the voting equilibrium car charge with lump-sum revenue redistribution and
no subsidy to public transport (s = 0). Suppose that there is insufficient political support for
the car charge, that is tFB > tE0 . The equilibrium piE is such that when user costs of public
transport are reduced, setting s > 0, we have (t+ s)FB > tE (s) + s > tE0 only if α < 1.
We have argued above that charge t and subsidy to public transport s are perfectly substi-
tutable instruments from the perspective of a welfare-maximizing government (see expression
(3)). This is because, due to the fixed amount of trips assumption, t and s enter travel de-
mands in exactly the same way. A marginal increase in s induces travelers to reduce car use
to the advantage of public transport. This reduces, for each local voter, the extra (private)
expenditures generated by an increase in the road toll. However, a larger subsidy not only
increases governmental expenditures s(Y − Q), but also reduces the tax base tQ. This has
a negative impact on voters because the lump-sum transfer the government can pay back
is diminished. Such a negative impact is fully internalized if the public transport subsidy
is entirely financed by the city (i.e. α = 1). In that case, a positive s leads to an equal
reduction in the most-preferred charge t by any voter (with respect to the case in which the
subsidy were not provided). When, instead, the subsidy is only partially financed by the city
government (i.e. α < 1), local voters do not fully internalize its impact on public finances.
As a consequence, when s is provided, the equilibrium car charge is reduced less than pro-
portionally. Hence, conditionally on s, tE is higher than when α = 1 and, most importantly,
closer to the welfare optimum (t+ s)FB. See Figure 4 for an illustration.
Road pricing is usually proposed as part of “policy packages” that include subsidies to
public transport. Proposition 3 suggests that, when combined with a proposal for a road toll,
the subsidy to public transport has a welfare-enhancing effect only as long as its cost is not
financed entirely by the local government. This provides an additional justification to the
provision of grants for public transport from national to local governments: according to our
result, these can be crucial in order to help relax political constraints on instruments such
transport that is used also by people in H. In order to have C choose a positive s, it would be necessary to
have α < 1. Therefore, the qualitative results would not change.
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Figure 4: The black line tFB(s) depicts the first best values of t conditionally on s: it is
downward sloping with a slope smaller than one in absolute value. The blue line tEα=1(s)
depicts the equilibrium values of the car charge t conditionally on s when α = 1. The red
line depicts tEα<1(s) when α < 1.
as road pricing. By choosing suboptimal car charges, (the majority of) city voters impose a
negative externality on the rest of the population. In the absence of a direct instrument that
aligns their interest with society’s, a financial contribution from a higher government level
corrects the “political” externality.
This result is also interesting from the perspective of second-best theory. Subsidizing
public transport, the argument goes, is optimal in the presence of political constraints on
a first best instrument, i.e. a pigouvian tax on car trips. Nevertheless, by endogenizing
the political constraint on the road toll, we have obtained here that simple provision of the
subsidy may not be useful. Extra funding for the local government may be required.
4.2.2 Earmarking of car charge revenues for public transportation
An often debated issue is whether earmarking revenues of road pricing for public transporta-
tion can improve public acceptability. To investigate it, we now compare voting equilibria
on the road toll t under lump-sum redistribution (a generic form of rebate) and earmarking.
The voting equilibrium under earmarking is denoted piEe =
(
tEe ; s
E
e
)
. We have argued above
that the first-best policy vector piFB is such that the optimal combination of car charges and
improvements to public transport is equal to the marginal external cost of a car trip, i.e.
(t+ s)FB = γQFB. Since there is an infinity of couples t, s whose sum is equal to (t+ s)FB,
we have an infinite set of piFB vectors. However, in the earmarking regime, the first-best
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vector piFBe is unique, since, in addition, it has to satisfy the budgetary-balance condition
BB : tFBe Q
FB
e = αs
FB
e
(
Y −QFBe
)
where QFBe ≡ Q
(
piFBe
)
and, again, α is the fraction of subsidy expenditures financed by the
city government. We obtain the following
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that, when revenues are redistributed lump-sum, the voting
equilibrium is such that the road toll is below the optimum. Earmarking revenues for (a
subsidy to) public transport brings to an equilibrium such that, conditionally on the subsidy,
the toll is closer to the optimum only if these revenues are topped up with extra funds by the
national government.
Denote as tE0 the car charge obtained as a voting equilibrium with lump-sum revenue
redistribution and no public transport subsidy (s = 0). Suppose that, in such case, there
is insufficient political support for the car charge, that is tFB > tE0 . Earmarking car charge
revenues to finance subsidies to public transport leads to an equilibrium piEe =
(
tEe , s
E
e
)
such
that (t+ s)FB ≥ tEe + sEe > tE0 only if α < 1. The intuition for this result is related to
that of Proposition 3. With earmarking, lower cost of using public transport shrinks the
tax base (i.e. car trips) from which revenues are drawn. Moreover, it increases expenditures
for the city government, as demand for public transport goes up. Because of this, it turns
out, the amount of funds actually available for public transport is insufficient to compensate
voters opposing the car charge. When no extra funds are granted to the city government,
conditionally on s, the difference between the optimal toll and the equilibrium one is the same
as when revenues are rebated lump-sum. As a result, no change in social welfare is produced.
On the contrary, when the subsidy to public transport is financed by both earmarked charge
revenues and additional external funds, i.e. α < 1, the equilibrium toll, conditionally on
s, is closer to the welfare optimum. Therefore, social welfare goes up. See Figure 5 for an
illustration.
Previous findings by De Borger and Proost (2012, Proposition 4) have suggested that
earmarking revenues for public transportation can help soften voter‘s reluctance to accept
socially-optimal road tolls. Our result differs in that is suggests that, in order to be welfare-
enhancing, toll revenues have to be topped up by an external government.
As mentioned above, tangible financial support at the national level typically accompa-
nies urban road pricing proposals. Our results may provide an additional justification for
such practice. Indeed, price reductions to public transport in Copenhagen were unavailable,
as compensation for the proposed road toll, also because the national government would not
cover the projected shortfall for the local transit operator. On the other hand, the Swedish
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Figure 5: Comparison of equilibria under earmarking when charge revenues are topped up
with extra funds by the central government (i.e. α < 1) and when they are not (α = 1)
government funded part of the public transport expansion in Stockholm before the road pric-
ing trial. Furthermore, the British government set up the Urban Challenge Fund to support
municipalities that implement road pricing. These examples suggest that supplementary
financial support can be an important incentive to make road pricing appealing to local
policymakers.
5 A numerical example
We here provide a numerical illustration of the results. We consider four scenarios, each char-
acterized by distributions FC(r) and FH(r). These are very stylized, with a discrete support
including only 3 values: 0, 5000 and 10000. Since suburban car dependence characterizes
most cities, we chose to consider a population in H that is, for its majority, strongly attached
to cars. FH(r) is such that 70% of the population has strong preferences for cars (r = 10000),
while 30% does not care for driving (r = 0). The scenarios differ in FC(r), as we vary the
fraction of the city population characterized by r = 10000. The distributions are depicted
below. The remaining parameter values are as follows: λ = 0.75, α = 0.9, d = 20, Y = 100,
γ = 1.
In Scenario 1, FC(r) and FH(r) coincide. Focusing first on the ρ = l and s = 0 regime, we
can see that conditions ensuring too small car charge (tE < tFB), as seen in Proposition 2 are
verified. Moreover, the portion of individuals with high valuation for cars in H is sufficiently
large that the road toll is blocked, i.e. tER = 0. When improvements to public transport are
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introduced (we consider s = 0.1) we obtain a reduction in the equilibrium car tax tE smaller
than the value of s. This indicates that, when the fraction of subsidy expenditures financed
by the city is smaller than one, the local economy gets closer to the social optimum with
respect to the case in which there are no interventions on public transport. A similar effect
is observed when shifting to the earmarking (ρ = e) regime.
Scenario 2 and 3 present distributions of preferences in C such that the fraction of in-
dividuals strongly attached to cars is smaller than in Scenario 1. It is, nevertheless, still
dominant. Thus, while the majority of the population is still made of frequent drivers, the
total volume of car trips is smaller. Quite interestingly, this brings to charges which are even
smaller, compared to the first best, than in Scenario 1. The reason for this is that the volume
of funds that can be rebated to the population is smaller: the frequently-driving majority is
even more penalized by the introduction of traffic restraint measures. In both scenarios there
is no cordon toll and, in Scenario 3, the parking charge is also equal to zero. The role of s is
the same as in Scenario 1. Switching to ρ = e in Scenario 3 does not bring to any change in
the equilibrium: this is due to the fact that, with a zero tax being the optimal choice of the
city population, no funds for s are available even when earmarking is introduced.
Finally, in Scenario 4, people with strong valuation for cars do not represent the majority
in the city anymore, while they still do in the hinterland. The result we obtain is that of a
parking charge that is above the optimum. Yet, the equilibrium is still such that there is no
road toll.
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6 Concluding remarks
In the first part of this work, we have studied how the institutional setup may influence traffic
congestion policy. We have looked at a setup which seems to be quite commonplace in reality,
with a regional government controlling a cordon toll and a city council controlling a parking
charge. The political acceptability of a policy such as road pricing is enhanced by letting
city governments decide whether to adopt it, just as it normally is the case for parking fees.
Nevertheless, letting the city government control all traffic policy instruments is not always
socially optimal. We found that a setup where two non-coordinating governments charge for
access to the same piece of infrastructure (the congestible road) may be superior, in terms of
social welfare, to one in which all car charges are under the control of the city government.
In the second part of the paper, we have considered the role of public transport subsidies as
a compensation for voters when a road toll is proposed: we have found that earmarking rev-
enues of road pricing for public transport improvements can improve acceptability, although
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additional financial support from national governments is necessary.
Of course the results obtained rest on some important assumptions. Most importantly,
we have focused only on short run effects of traffic policy, ignoring residential mobility and
land markets. In the long run, these are obviously likely to impact the choices of local
governments. While the study of long-run effects of traffic policy is beyond the scope of our
analysis, we believe at least part of the forces we described would still be relevant. We plan
to extend the research in this direction in future work.
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Appendix
Remark Except for Proposition 4, all the following derivations are obtained assuming the
public transport subsidy s to be set at an exogenous value (not necessarily zero). The proofs
we provide are therefore valid conditionally on any s, and, clearly, also in the special case in
which s = 0 (which we consider in the main text). Hence, the reader should look at all the
proofs up to that of Proposition 3 by constraining s = 0.
LEMMA A: When the C population votes on tC, and when the C and H population vote
on tR, for every voting variable (taking the others as given) voters’ preferences satisfy the
Single Crossing Property
PROOF: When the C population votes on tC , given tR and s, define
MRSCtCLC (pi; r) ≡
∂V C(pi;r)
∂tC
∂V C(pi;r)
∂LC
MRSCKLC (pi; r) ≡
∂V C(pi;r)
∂K
∂V C(pi;r)
∂LC
and when the C and H population vote on tR, given tC and s, define
MRSCtRLR(pi; r) ≡
∂V C(pi;r)
∂tR
∂V C(pi;r)
∂LR
MRSHtRLR(pi; r) ≡
∂V H(pi;r)
∂tR
∂V H(pi;r)
∂LR
Now MRSCtCLC = MRS
C
tRLR
= MRSHtRLR = −q(r) ·
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
, for any pi and r. Therefore
∂MRS/∂r = −∂q(r)
∂r
·
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
< 0, since ∂q
∂r
> 0 and 1 + TQ dQdp > 0 for any pi and r. Using
the results of Gans and Smart (1996), the Single Crossing condition holds. 
Derivation of the benchmark policy
The objective is
max
{t,s}
W (pi)
The first order conditions are
∂W
∂t
=
∂W
∂s
= −QTQdQ
dp
+ (t+ s)
dQ
dp
= 0⇒ t+ s = QTQ
(Recall that dp
dt
= 1). Let ΠFB be the set of stationary points ofW (pi). We now verify that all
elements of ΠFB are characterized by the same value of (t+ s)FB (which is therefore unique).
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We have
∂2W
∂t2
=
∂2W
∂s2
= −
(
dQ
dp
)2
TQ −QTQd
2Q
dp2
+
dQ
dp
+ (t+ s)
d2Q
dp2
In the neighborhood of any element of ΠFB (for which the first order conditions above hold),
this expressions simplifies to
∂2W
∂t2
=
∂2W
∂s2
=
dQ
dp
−
(
dQ
dp
)2
TQ < 0
Thus, given thatW (pi) is a continuously differentiable function of pi, there can exist a unique
value of (t+ s)FB and W (pi) is a strictly concave function of pi. The benchmark policy of
page 11 can simply be obtained by constraining s = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1
By Single Crossing, proved in Lemma A, we have existence of majority voting equilibria
tC(tR; s) = t
∗
C(tR; s, rˆC) (this follows from a result in Gans and Smart (1996)). We proceed
assuming that t∗C(tR; s, rˆC) is an interior maximizer of VC(pi; rˆC), for given, tR and s. This is
always the case in equilibrium. We verify in Technical Appendix A that (for given tR and s)
any tC satisfying the first order condition ∂VC(pi;rˆC)∂tC = 0 also satisfies the second order condi-
tion. Thus, since VC(pi; rˆC) is a continuously differentiable function of tC , t∗C(tR; s, rˆC) must
be unique.
Let us now prove the comparative statics. In a neighborhood of tC(tR; s), we can express
tC as function of rˆC ,λ,tR and s, using the Implicit Function Theorem. We have
∂tC
∂rˆC
= −
∂2VC
∂tC∂rˆC
∂2VC
∂t2C
∂tC
∂λ
= −
∂2VC
∂tC∂λ
∂2VC
∂t2
C
∂tC
∂tR
= −
∂2VC
∂tC∂tR
∂2VC
∂t2C
The denominator of all three expressions is ∂
2VC
∂t2C
< 0, by second order conditions (see
Technical Appendix A). Let us look at ∂
2VC
∂tC∂rˆC
and ∂
2VC
∂tC∂λ
. It can be easily verified that
∂2VC
∂tC∂rˆC
< 0 and ∂
2VC
∂tC∂λ
< 0. Hence, ∂tC
∂rˆC
< 0 and ∂tC
∂λ
< 0, as stated in the text. Let us now
focus on ∂tC
∂tR
. We prove in the Technical Appendix A that ∂
2VC
∂tC∂tR
< 0 in the neighborhood of
tC(tR, s). As a consequence, ∂tC∂tR > −1 if and only if
∂2VC
∂tC∂tR
< ∂
2VC
∂t2C
. Since ∂F1
∂tR
+ dQ
dp
( 1
λ
−1) = ∂F1
∂tC
and dQ
dp
( 1
λ
− 1) < 0, then the condition is verified. Thus, 0 > ∂tC
∂tR
> −1.
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Technical Appendix A
The second derivative of VC (pi; rˆC) with respect to tC is
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂t2C
= −dq (rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
− q (rˆC)
(
TQ
d2Q
dp2
)
+
2dQ
dp
+ (tC + αs)
d2Q
dp2
λ
+ tR
d2Q
dp2
in the neighborhood of interior (local) maximizers of VC , using (5) (equated to zero), we can
replace −q (rˆC)TQ + (tC+αs)λ + tR and rewrite the above expression as
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂t2C
= −dq (rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+
2dQ
dp
λ
+
(
q (rˆC)− Qλ
dQ/dp
)
d2Q
dp2
This expression can be simplified using dQ
dp
, dq(r)
dp
and d
2Q
dp2
. We have
dq(r)
dp
= − r
1
2
(p+ T − A+ s)3 + r¯TQ
and
d2Q
dp2
=
3
4
r¯ · (p+ T − A+ s)
5(
1
2
(p+ T − A+ s)3 + r¯TQ
)3
with dQ
dp
= dq(r¯)
dp
. Substituting into ∂
2VC(pi;rˆC)
∂t2C
and rearranging, we have
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂t2C
=
1
2
(
rˆC − 2 r¯λ
)
(p+ T − A+ s)3 − 2
λ
r¯2TQ − 34
(
rˆC − r¯λ
)
(p+ T − A+ s)3(
1
2
(p+ T − A+ s)3 + r¯TQ
)2
since the denominator is positive, the sign of ∂
2VC(pi;rˆC)
∂t2C
depends on its numerator. Let us
focus on it. One needs, first, to divide it by (p+ T − A+ s)3 to obtain, using T = TQQ and
Q = r¯
(p+T−A+s)2 ,
1
2
(
rˆC − 2 r¯
λ
)
− 2
λ
r¯T
p+ T − A+ s −
3
4
(
rˆC − r¯
λ
)
Simple rearrangements allow us to write
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂t2C
< 0⇔ T
p+ T − A+ s > −
1
8
(
rˆCλ
r¯
+ 1
)
The last expression being negative, the condition is always verified. This implies that second
order condition are verified. Consider now
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂tC∂tR
= −dq (rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
−q (rˆC)
(
TQ
d2Q
dp2
)
+
dQ
dp
+ (tC + αs)
d2Q
dp2
λ
+tR
d2Q
dp2
+
dQ
dp
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in the neighborhood of interior (local) maximizers of VC , using (5) (equated to zero), we can
write it as
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂tC∂tR
= −dq (rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+
(
1 +
1
λ
)
dQ
dp
+
(
q (rˆC)− Qλ
dQ/dp
)
d2Q
dp2
following similar steps as above, we obtain
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂tC∂tR
< 0⇔ T
p+ T − A+ s > −
1
4
rˆC
r¯
(
λ
λ+ 1
)
+
(
3
4 (λ+ 1)
− 1
2
)
which is always verified, given that rˆC ∈ [0, 2r¯], as long as (but not only if) λ ≥ 12 .
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of single-peakedness of tax preferences on tR (given tC and s)
The most-preferred tC∗R (tC ; s, r), given tC and s, for an individual living in C, satisfies the
following first order condition
∂VC (pi; r)
∂tR
= −q(r) ·
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+
(tC + αs)
dQ
dp
λ
+Q+ tR
dQ
dp
≤ 0
similarly, for an individual living in H, tH∗R (tC ; s, r) satisfies
∂VH (pi; r)
∂tR
= −q(r) ·
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+ tR
dQ
dp
+Q ≤ 0
If the latter is negative for all tR, then clearly tH∗R (tC ; s, r) = 0 and VH (pi; r) is everywhere
decreasing in tR. The same can be said for tC∗R (tC ; s, r) = 0 and VC (pi; r). Single-peakedness
would immediately follow. Consider the case in which, instead, there is at least one tR such
that the first order conditions above hold at equality (i.e. a stationary point of either VC
or VH , given tC and s). We prove in Technical Appendix B that such a point (for any r)
would also satisfy second order conditions. This implies that any stationary point of VC (pi; r)
and VH (pi; r) is a local maximizer. However, since these are continuously differentiable func-
tions of tR (given tC and s, for any r), they can have at most one local maximizer. As a
consequence, single-peakedness holds.
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Technical Appendix B
The first derivative of VH (pi; rˆH) with respect to tR is
∂VH (pi; rˆH)
∂tR
= −q(rˆH)
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+ tR
dQ
dp
+Q
and the second derivative is
∂2VH (pi; rˆH)
∂t2R
= −dq(rˆH)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
− (rˆH)
(
TQ
d2Q
dp2
)
+ 2
dQ
dp
+ tR
d2Q
dp2
The first derivative of VC (pi; rˆC) with respect to tR is
∂VC (pi; rˆC)
∂tR
= −q(rˆC)
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+
(tC + αs)
dQ
dp
λ
+Q+ tR
dQ
dp
and the second derivative is
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂t2R
= −dq(rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
− q(rˆC)
(
TQ
d2Q
dp2
)
+
(tC + αs)
d2Q
dp2
λ
+ 2
dQ
dp
+ tR
d2Q
dp2
In the neighborhood of interior (local) maximizers of VH (pi; rˆH) and VC (pi; rˆC), using, re-
spectively ∂VH(pi;rˆH)
∂tR
= 0 and ∂VC(pi;rˆC)
∂tR
= 0, we can write ∂
2VC(pi;rˆC)
∂t2R
and ∂
2VH(pi;rˆH)
∂t2R
as
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂t2R
= −dq(rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+ 2
dQ
dp
+
(
q(rˆC)−Q
dQ/dp
)
d2Q
dp2
∂2VH (pi; rˆH)
∂t2R
= −dq(rˆH)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+ 2
dQ
dp
+
(
q(rˆH)−Q
dQ/dp
)
d2Q
dp2
Following the steps of Technical Appendix A, rearrangements allow us to write that
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂t2R
=
∂2VH (pi; rˆH)
∂t2R
< 0⇔ T
p+ T − A+ s > −
1
8
(
rˆi
r¯
+ 1
)
i = C,H
The last expression being negative, the condition is always verified. This implies that second
order conditions are verified.
Proof that tR (tC ; s) lies in the interval I =
[
tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC), t
H∗
R (tC ; s, rˆH)
]
Suppose tR (tC ; s) < tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) ≤ tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC). Given Lemma A, Single-Crossing of pref-
erences for tR implies that at least half of the H population would strictly prefer tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH)
to tR (tC ; s). The same has to be true for at least half of the individuals in C, given
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that rˆC also prefers tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) to tR (tC ; s) by single-peakedness. Therefore, tR (tC ; s) <
tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) ≤ tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC) is not possible. It cannot be a Condorcet Winner since at
least half of the total population would prefer a tR between tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) and tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC) to
tR (tC ; s). A similar reasoning shows that tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) ≤ tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC) < tR (tC ; s) is not pos-
sible either. The reasoning would be the same had we supposed tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) ≥ tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC).
We now prove that tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) ≥ tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC). Consider any equilibrium vector piE.
Since tEC = t∗C(tR; s, rˆC) , piE must satisfy the first-order condition
∂VC (pi; r)
∂tC
= −q(rˆC)
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+
Q+ (tC + αs)
dQ
dp
λ
+ tR
dQ
dp
≤ 0
which implies that, when evaluated at piE,
∂VC (pi; r)
∂tR
= −q(rˆC)
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+
(tC + αs)
dQ
dp
λ
+Q+ tR
dQ
dp
< 0
since Q
λ
−Q > 0. We have shown above that voters’ preferences over tR, given tC and s, are
single-peaked. Thus, both ∂VC(pi;r)
∂tR
and ∂VH(pi;r)
∂tR
are decreasing in tR. Now, when evaluated at
tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC),
∂VC(pi;r)
∂tR
= 0.20 Therefore, if ∂VC(pi;r)
∂tR
< 0 when evaluated at piE, it must be the
case that tER > tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC). Now consider the first-order derivative for individual rˆH
∂V H (pi; r)
∂tR
= −q(rˆH)
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+Q+ tR
dQ
dp
still evaluating at piE. There are 2 possibilities: if ∂V
H(pi;r)
∂tR
≥ 0, tER is smaller (or equal) than
tH∗R (tC , s; rˆH) because of single-peakedness. Then, surely tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) ≥ tER > tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC).
If ∂V
H(pi;r)
∂tR
< 0, unless tER = 0 (in which case tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) = tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC) = 0), the piE
considered cannot be an equilibrium. This is because we would have
max
(
tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC); t
H∗
R (tC ; s, rˆH)
)
< tER
which is not possible, as proven above. The consequence of this reasoning is that there is
no piE such that tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC) > 0. We must always have that tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC) = 0. This also
means that piE must always be such that tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) ≥ tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC).
20This is true unless tC∗R (tC , s; rˆC) = 0 as a corner solution. If it were the case, anyway, we would be sure
that tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) ≥ tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC).
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Proof of Lemma 3
Let us begin from the case in which the most-preferred tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) is an interior maximizer,
i.e. such that ∂V
H(pi;r)
∂tR
= 0. It is unique, by single-peakedness of voters preferences for tR,
proved in Lemma 2. It then has to satisfy
F :
∂V H (pi; r)
∂tR
= −q(rˆH)
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+ tR
dQ
dp
+Q = 0
the Implicit Function Theorem tells us that ∂t
H∗
R (tC ;s,rˆH)
∂tC
= −
∂F
∂tC
∂F
∂tR
. Now, ∂F
∂tR
= ∂
2V H(pi;r)
∂t2R
< 0
when evaluated at tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH). This is proven in Technical Appendix B. Moreover,
∂F
∂tC
= −dq(rˆH)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
− q(rˆH)TQd
2Q
dp2
+ tR
d2Q
dp2
+
dQ
dp
When evaluated at tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH), as we prove in Technical Appendix C,
∂F
∂tC
= ∂
2V H(pi;r)
∂tR∂tC
< 0.
Therefore, we get ∂t
H∗
R (tC ;s,rˆH)
∂tC
< 0. Focus now on the case in which tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) = 0 as a
corner solution. Then necessarily ∂t
H∗
R (tC ;s,rˆH)
∂tC
= 0.
Proof of uniqueness of p¯i Let us begin from the case in which p¯i is such that tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) =
0 as a corner solution. Then p¯i = (tC (0; s) , tR = 0). Uniqueness of p¯i follows from Lemma 1.
Consider now the case in which tH∗R (tC ; s, rˆH) is an interior maximizer of V H (pi; r). p¯i is
such that the following conditions hold
F1 : ∂VC(pi;r)
∂tC
= −q(rˆC)
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+
Q+(tC+αs)
dQ
dp
λ
+ tR
dQ
dp
= 0
F2 : ∂VH(pi;r)
∂tR
= −q(rˆH)
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+ tR
dQ
dp
+Q = 0
F1 implicitly defines tC as a continuously differentiable function of tR (as well as other
policy parameters here treated as given). Similarly, F2 implicitly defines tR as a continuously
differentiable function of tC . By the Implicit Function Theorem, we have
∂tR
∂tC F1
= −
∂F1
∂tC
∂F1
∂tR
= −
−dq(rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
− q(rˆC)TQ d2Qdp2 +
2 dQ
dp
+(tC+αs)
d2Q
dp2
λ
+ tR
d2Q
dp2
−dq(rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
− q(rˆC)TQ d2Qdp2 +
dQ
dp
+(tC+αs)
d2Q
dp2
λ
+ tR
d2Q
dp2
+ dQ
dp
∂tR
∂tC F2
= −
∂F2
∂tC
∂F2
∂tR
= −
−dq(rˆH)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
− q(rˆH)TQ d2Qdp2 + tR d
2Q
dp2
+ dQ
dp
−dq(rˆH)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
− q(rˆH)TQ d2Qdp2 + tR d
2Q
dp2
+ 2dQ
dp
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We have shown in Technical Appendix A that ∂F1
∂tC
= ∂
2VC
∂t2C
< 0 and ∂F1
∂tR
= ∂
2VC
∂tC∂tR
< 0, when
evaluated in the neighborhood of p¯i. Note that ∂F1
∂tC
> ∂F1
∂tR
, since 2
λ
dQ
dp
<
(
1 + 1
λ
)
dQ
dp
. Let
us now look at ∂tR
∂tC F2
. We prove in Technical Appendix C that both ∂F2
∂tC
= ∂
2VH
∂tC∂tR
< 0 and
∂F2
∂tR
= ∂
2VH
∂t2R
< 0, when evaluated in the neighborhood of p¯i. Moreover, given that 2dQ
dp
< dQ
dp
,
we have ∂F2
∂tC
< ∂F2
∂tR
. Thus, F1 and F2 define, in a neighborhood of p¯i, tR as a strictly
decreasing function of tC . Now, p¯i is necessarily such that both these functions cross on the
(tR, tC) plane. Since we have (at couples satisfying both F1 and F2) that ∂tR∂tC F1 <
∂tR
∂tC F2
< 0,
it has to be the case that the first function crosses the second only from above. Since both
are continuous, the crossing is unique. Therefore, tC and t¯R have to be unique.
Proof of uniqueness of pi We have proven in Lemma 2 that tC∗R (tC ; s, rˆC) = 0 at any
piE, including pi. So pi is such that tR = 0, and, therefore, t¯C coincides with tC (0; s). This is
unique, as proven in Lemma 1.
Characterization of the bounds for tEC and tER Recall from Lemma 1 that −1 < ∂tC∂tR <
0. Suppose that there existed a piE such that tER > t¯R and, consequently, tEC < tC . Then
tER > t
H∗
R (t
E
C ; s, rˆH). However, tER > tH∗R (tEC ; s, rˆH) is not possible since, as proven in Lemma 2,
piE must be such that tH∗R (tEC ; s, rˆH) ≥ tER. Similarly, we can prove that an equilibrium where
tER < tR = 0 and tEC > t¯C is not possible. Finally, since −1 < ∂tC∂tR < 0, the bounds for tEC + tER
must be given by t¯C ≤ tEC + tER ≤ tC + tR.
Technical appendix C
We have
∂2VH (pi; rˆH)
∂tR∂tC
= −dq(rˆH)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
− q(rˆH)TQd
2Q
dp2
+ tR
d2Q
dp2
+
dQ
dp
using the first order condition ∂VH(pi;rˆH)
∂tR
= 0 (holding by assumption, since we are focusing
on interior solutions), we can write it as
∂2VH (pi; rˆH)
∂tR∂tC
= −dq(rˆH)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+
dQ
dp
+
(
q(rˆH)−Q
dQ/dp
)
d2Q
dp2
Using dQ
dp
, dq(r)
dp
and d
2Q
dp2
, as in Technical Appendix A, similar rearrangements yield
∂2VH (pi; rˆH)
∂tR∂tC
< 0⇔ T
p+ T − A+ s > −
1
4
(
rˆH
2r¯
− 1
)
which is always verified since rˆH ∈ [0, 2r¯].
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Proof of Proposition 1
Consider condition (5). When s = 0 and setting tR = 0, this expression is the same as ∂W (pi)∂t
if and only if rˆC = r¯λ . It is only in that case that t
E
C = T
FB
Q Q
E (recall that T FBQ = γ). Since
tC − T FBQ Q is strictly increasing in tC , then it is only if rˆC = r¯λ that tEC = tFB. Since (by
Lemma 1) tEC is decreasing in rˆC and λ, the rest of the claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 2
To begin, let us focus on p¯i. Consider, first, the case in which p¯i is such that tC and t¯R are
interior maximizers of, respectively, VC (p¯i; r) and VH (p¯i; r). Conditions described as F1 and
F2 in the proof of Lemma 3 must thus hold at p¯i. Substituting tR dQdp = q(rˆH)·
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
−Q
from F2 into F1, multiplying both sides of the resulting expression by λ, and finally adding
it to F2 we obtain an equation that can replace F1. The result is the following equivalent
system
F4 : −q(rˆ) ·
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+ (t+ αs)dQ
dp
+ (2− λ)Q = 0
F2 : −q(rˆH) ·
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+ tR
dQ
dp
+Q = 0
where rˆ = rˆCλ+ (1− λ) rˆH . Importantly, F4 contains terms that are function only of t, not
of its components tC , tR. Thus, condition F4, by the Implicit Function Theorem, implicitly
defines t¯. Importantly, F4 contains only terms that are function of t¯, not of its components
tC and t¯R. We can use the Implicit Function Theorem to obtain that
∂t¯
∂rˆ
= −
∂F4
∂rˆ
∂F4
∂t¯
∂t¯
∂λ
= − ∂F4∂λ∂F4
∂t¯
We prove in Technical Appendix D that ∂F4
∂t¯
< 0. The numerator of ∂t¯
∂rˆ
is ∂F4
∂rˆ
< 0. Hence,
∂t¯
∂rˆ
= − ∂F4∂rˆ∂F4
∂t¯
< 0. One can repeat the reasoning using λ as the independent variable, instead
of rˆ, and obtain similar results.
Next, we prove that there exists a unique value r+ ≡ r¯
(
1 + 1−λ
1+TQ
dQ(tFB)
dp
)
, such that if
rˆ = r+, then p¯i is such that t¯ = tFB. Take condition F4 and add QTQ dQdp to both sides. The
equality obtained implies (since q(r) = r
(p+T−A+s)2 and q(r¯) = Q) that
(2− λ)r¯ − rˆ
(p+ T − A+ s)2 + (Q− q(rˆ))TQ
dQ
dp
T 0⇔ (t− TQQ) dQ
dp
S 0⇔ t− TQQ T 0
We evaluate these expressions at p¯i. Now note that h(t¯) = t¯ − TQQ(p¯i) (where TQ = γ) is
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a strictly increasing function of t¯. Then h(t¯) = 0 if and only if t¯ = TQQ(p¯i). Therefore, we
must have
t¯ = TQQ(p¯i)⇔ (2− λ)r¯ − rˆ
(p+ T − A+ s)2 + (Q− q(rˆ)) T¯Q
dQ
dp
= 0
One then needs to rearrange the second equality, using q(r) = r
(p+T−A+s)2 and q(r¯) = Q, to
see that it is verified if and only if rˆ = r¯
(
1 + 1−λ
1+T¯Q
dQ
dp
)
. If such a condition holds, we thus
have t¯ = tFB. One then needs to use ∂t¯
∂rˆ
< 0, proven above, to see that t¯ < tFB if rˆ ≥ r+ and
that t¯ ≥ tFB and if rˆ < r+.
To conclude the proof, consider the case in which p¯i is such that t¯R = 0. In such a case,
piE = p¯i =pi. pi coincides with tC (0; s), whose comparison to piFB was provided in Proposition
1. By Lemma 3, t¯C ≤ tC + t¯R. The last point of Proposition 2 follows. Proposition 1 also
established that t¯C ≤ tFB a if rˆC < r¯λ . This is why when rˆ > r+ and rˆC < r¯λ , we can be sure
that piE = p¯i =pi, so tER = 0.
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 2 Consider the case rˆ > r+ and rˆC > r¯λ . Then
t¯C ≤ tE < tFB . W (pi) is a concave function of t, maximized (conditionally on s = 0) at
t = tFB . The claim follows from the last point in Proposition 2.
Technical appendix D
We intend to prove that condition
F4 : −q(rˆ) ·
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+ (t+ αs)
dQ
dp
+ (2− λ)Q = 0
where rˆ = rˆCλ + (1− λ) rˆH is such that, in the neighborhood of p¯i, its derivative ∂F4∂t is
negative. This derivative is
−dq(rˆ)
dp
·
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+ (3− λ)dQ
dp
+ (t+ αs− q(rˆ)TQ)d
2Q
dp2
using F4, it can be written as
−dq(rˆ)
dp
·
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+ (3− λ)dQ
dp
+
(
q(rˆ)− (2− λ)Q
dQ/dp
)
d2Q
dp2
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now using dQ
dp
, dq(r)
dp
and d
2Q
dp2
, as in Technical Appendix A, similar rearrangements allow us to
write that
∂F4
∂t
< 0⇔ T
p+ T − A+ s > −
rˆ
4r¯ (3− λ) +
3
4
(
2− λ
3− λ −
2
3
)
which is always verified, since the right hand side is negative.
Proof of Proposition 3
We prove that ∂t
∂s
> −1. In the equilibrium, condition F1 provided in the proof of Lemma 3
must be satisfied (i.e. ∂VC(pi;rˆC)
∂tC
= 0), setting tR = 0 and denoting now tC as t. This condition
defines tC (0; s) (which we may now denote as t(s)). Note also that here the vector of policy
variables is pi = (t, s) and not pi = (tC , tR). The Implicit Function Theorem tells us that, in
a neighborhood of t(s)
∂t
∂s
= −
∂F1
∂s
∂F1
∂t
where
∂F1
∂s
= −dq(rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
− q (rˆC)TQ d2Qdp2 +
dQ
dp
+t d
2Q
dp2
+αs d
2Q
dp2
+α dQ
dp
λ
∂F1
∂t
= −dq(rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
− q (rˆC)TQ d2Qdp2 +
2 dQ
dp
+t d
2Q
dp2
+αs d
2Q
dp2
λ
Now, ∂F1
∂tC
= ∂
2VC
∂t2
< 0 in the neighborhood of tC (0; s), as proven in Technical Appendix
A. Therefore, ∂t
∂s
> −1 if and only if ∂F1
∂s
> ∂F1
∂t
. This condition is always verified in a
neighborhood of tC (0; s). This is because, as we prove in Technical Appendix E, ∂F1∂s =
∂2VC
∂tC∂s
< 0 if (though not only if) α ≥ 1
2
. If so, then ∂F1
∂s
> ∂F1
∂t
, since ∂F1
∂t
= ∂F1
∂s
+ (1−α)
λ
dQ
dp
. If
instead ∂F1
∂s
> 0, then ∂F1
∂s
> ∂F1
∂t
anyway.
Technical Appendix E
Consider
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂tC∂s
= −dq (rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
−q (rˆC)
(
TQ
d2Q
dp2
)
+
(1 + α) dQ
dp
+ (tC + αs)
d2Q
dp2
λ
+tR
d2Q
dp2
in the neighborhood of interior (local) maximizers of VC (pi; rˆC), using (5) (equated to zero),
we can write it as
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∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂tC∂tR
= −dq (rˆC)
dp
(
1 + TQ
dQ
dp
)
+
(1 + α)
λ
dQ
dp
+
(
q (rˆC)− Qλ
dQ/dp
)
d2Q
dp2
using dQ
dp
, dq(r)
dp
and d
2Q
dp2
, as in Technical Appendix A and following similar steps we obtain
∂2VC (pi; rˆC)
∂tC∂s
< 0⇔ T
p+ T − A+ s > −
1
4
rˆC
r¯
(
λ
1 + α
)
+
(
3
4 (1 + α)
− 1
2
)
which is always verified at least as long as (but not only if) α ≥ 1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 4
Our strategy to identify piEe is the following. Suppose s could be set independently of t, as
in the ρ = l regime. Then we would be back to the setup of Lemma 1. We have proved
there that, for each value of s, there exists an equilibrium tE (s) (where we set now t = tC
as tR = 0). Thus, by varying s, we can describe a set of equilibrium car charges tE(s). Let
Σ be the set of
(
tE (s) , s
)
couples. Among the elements of Σ, the equilibrium vector under
earmarking piEe =
(
tEe , s
E
e
)
is the unique one satisfying the budgetary rule
BB : tQ− αs (Y −Q) = 0
We proceed assuming that vectors piFBe and piEe are such that BB describes s as an increasing
function of t, so ∂s
∂t BB
> 0.21
For a given value of s, tE (s) = tC (0; s) is described by conditions named F1 and F2 in
the proof of Lemma 1. In the proof of Proposition 3, we have argued that tE (s) = tC (0; s)
is such that ∂t
∂s
> −1. When adopting the BB rebate rule, there are two possibilities: if,
for s = 0, piE is such that tE0 = 0, then imposing BB will leave the equilibrium unchanged.
If, instead, when s = 0, piE is such that tE0 > 0, piEe must be such that both tEe and sEe are
strictly positive. However, any vector in Σ is such that ∂t
∂s
> −1. Therefore, piEe must be such
that tEe + sEe > tE0 .
A priori, we cannot rule out the possibility that tEe + sEe > tFBe + sFBe . This will happen if
α is small enough. However, GW can always set α “large enough” (i.e. close enough to one)
to make sure that tFBe + sFBe > tEe + sEe > tE0 .
21Using the Implicit Function Theorem, one can show that this is true as long as Q + tdQdp + αs
dQ
dp > 0.
That is, a marginal increase in the car tax produces an increase in the revenues generated by the tax itself
(net of expenditures for s). Note that, in our setup, the highest possible value of t, in equilibrium, is the
most-preferred by the individual for which r = 0. Since she never drives, this individual will simply choose t
so as to maximize total (net) revenues tQ − αs (Y −Q). There is no reason for her to pick a tax such that
marginal revenues are negative.
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